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The Fate of Durable Solutions in Protracted
Refugee Situations: The Odyssey of Afghan
Refugees in Pakistan

Waseem Ahmad*
A protracted refugee situation is always critical and challenging in terms
of finding durable solutions. The Afghan population in Pakistan is complex
and one of the world’s most protracted refugee case load.1 The response to
Afghan refugees has almost always been structured within the framework of
“Durable Solutions.”2 However, such traditional approaches are unable to
overcome the specific challenges stemming from a refugee population that
has remained in exile for over 37 years. This grave issue needs out-of-thebox solutions. The international community has focused largely on refugee
emergencies, but the complexity of a protracted situation is that it has moved
*

The author works in the humanitarian sector to protect and promote the rights of refugees
and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). During the 2015-16 academic year, he was a
Hubert H. Humphrey Fellow at American University Washington College of Law. I extend
foremost thanks to Professor Jayesh M. Rathod, Professor of Law and Director of the
Immigrant Justice Clinic at American University Washington College of Law. I am obliged
for his extraordinary support and guidance throughout my research work. I am grateful to
Professor Padideh Ala’i, Professor of Law and Director of the Hubert H. Humphrey
Fellowship Program at American University Washington College of Law, for her valuable
feedback and support. I am also indebted to Mr. Yahya Bakhtyar, Researcher and Senior
Economist at the Planning and Development department in the Government of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (Pakistan), for his treasured comments. Finally, I am thankful to the UNHCR
Pakistan, particularly Sub Office Peshawar and Commissionerate Afghan Refugees (CAR)
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Pakistan), for their esteemed cooperation.
1
See Pakistan, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, http://unhcrpk.org/ (last
visited Dec. 26, 2016).
2
The United Nations High Commissioner’s basic functions are defined in paragraph 1 of
the Statute (G.A. Res. 428(V) at 48). Article 1 of the UNHCR Statute defines Durable
Solutions under two distinct headings: voluntary repatriation and assimilation into new
national communities. The second of these headings covers two alternatives: local
integration in the country of first asylum and resettlement in a third country.
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beyond the emergency phase and no longer requires mere lifesaving
protection and humanitarian assistance. Therefore, the political and strategic
aspects must also be addressed. The return of Afghan refugees in 2002 was
considered the single largest repatriation by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as of that date.3 Nevertheless, the
phenomenon of recycling remains a common practice in Pakistan.4 In this
context, serious questions have been raised over the viability, sustainability,
and durability of the return and reintegration of refugees in Afghanistan. The
induction of Solution Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR) as a regional
approach is a constructive step, though the implementation could be
challenging and would demand huge efforts. The Afghan case is most
perplexing because of its long duration, and not because of the numbers of
refugees involved. Despite the high level of response in terms of
humanitarian aid, the issue was, and still is, the victim of power politics, as
well as geopolitical and economic interests.
This article unfolds the historical aspects of the Afghan refugee situation
to find the root cause of the massive displacement of Afghan refugees, the
missing links in addressing the issue, and the common grounds for forced
displacement in the region to reset the direction of Durable Solutions. The
main purpose of this article is to examine the effectiveness of the preferred
durable solution and the fit of the regional solution strategy in the local
scenario of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Furthermore, the article seeks to
assess the available government machinery’s capacity and legal response, and
assistance from UN agencies and humanitarian organizations. Additionally,
the article aims to highlight the challenges of a sustainable return to

3

Afghanistan: Largest Single Refugee Repatriation Since 1972, U.N. HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (Sept. 3, 2002), http://unhcr.org/3d748f4b19.html.
4
Susanne Schmeidl, Repatriation to Afghanistan: Durable Solution or Responsibility
Shifting, 33 PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT 20, 20,
http://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/FMRpdfs/FMR33/20-22.pdf
(last visited Mar.10, 2017).
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Afghanistan to help draw a future road map that will address those
challenges.
The article first describes the roots of instability in Afghanistan that led to
the massive displacement of Afghan refugees. This is followed by historical
evidence of the massive influx of Afghan refugees, along with other recent
displacements in South Asia. This article then focuses on finding a way to
tackle challenges of the protracted refugee situation based on an analysis of
the durable solutions available to the UNHCR and the Government of
Pakistan’s response in handling Afghan refugees. Recycling and the
urbanization of Afghan refugees provide the basis for analyzing durable
solutions by identifying missing links and gaps in the UNHCR and
governmental responses. The lack of domestic legislation for refugees in
Pakistan and the fact that the country is not a signatory to relevant
international legal instruments have led to gaps in the legal status of Afghan
refugees, as well as shifts in their legal status over time. Comparing Afghan
Management and Repatriation Strategy (AMRS) with SSAR clarifies the
viability of both strategies. Therefore, the article offers a comprehensive
context for analyzing the case of Afghan refugees. Lastly, the article offers
recommendations for policy improvements, based upon the conclusions
drawn from analysis. These improvements specifically target all levels of
pragmatic policies and practices for relevant stakeholders to bring about the
end of the protracted refugee situation in Pakistan.

I. ROOTS OF INSTABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN
Since hitting world headlines in December 1979, Afghanistan is still
believed to be one of the most severely war-affected and politically unstable
countries in the world.5 In the last four decades, the political instability in
Afghanistan has led to an economic recession that propelled the social,
5

Timeline: Soviet War in Afghanistan, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7883532.stm (last visited Jan. 13, 2017) [hereinafter BBC
NEWS].

VOLUME 15 • ISSUE 3 • 2017

593

594 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

religious, and ethnic volatility in the country. 6 The Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in December 1979 was a decisive event during the Cold War.
While many historians have claimed that the Eastern and Western bloc
nations did not engage in direct warfare in the landlocked country of
Afghanistan; however, each bloc released its political pressure, and the
weapons of both were decidedly used in Afghanistan. 7
To justify their occupation of Afghanistan, the Soviets claimed that they
were stabilizing the government’s writ and trying to get rid of the “CIAsupported mercenaries.”8 Furthermore, the Soviets validated their occupation
under the umbrella of cooperation as a result of the Soviet-Afghan Friendship
Treaty.9 This treaty was signed in Moscow on December 5, 1978, between
Noor Muhammad Taraki (President of Afghanistan in 1978) and Leonid
Ilyich Brezhnev (President of USSR in 1978).10 According to Article 4 of the
Friendship Treaty, the high contracting parties agreed to cooperate with each
other on military matters to strengthen the defense capacity of both
countries.11 However, to establish close and secure relations, beginning in

The Economic Disaster Behind Afghanistan’s Mounting Human Crisis, INT’L CRISIS
GROUP (2016), https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/economicdisaster-behind-afghanistan-s-mounting-human-crisis (last visited Jan. 13, 2017).
7
“Eastern bloc” refers to the communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, which
were the allies of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. “Western bloc” or the
“Capitalist bloc” refers to the countries that were the allies of the United States and
NATO during the Cold War. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. Response,
1978-1980, OFF. HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/sovietinvasion-afghanistan (last visited Jan. 13, 2017).
8
Alam Payind, Soviet-Afghan Relations from Cooperation to Occupation, 21 INT. J.
MIDDLE EAST STUD. 107, 107-–28 (1989), http://www.jstor.org/stable/163642.
9
American Society of International Law, Afghanistan-Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation 3 (1980),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/20692120?ref=search
gateway:655e8b53ff323800528abfe85aa8ba13.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 2; Article 4 (1) stated, “The high contracting parties, acting in the spirit of the
traditions of friendship and good neighborliness, as well as the UN charter, shall consult
each other and take by agreement appropriate measures to ensure the security,
independence, and territorial integrity of the two countries.”
6
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1950 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) worked persistently
with Afghanistan to provide economic and military assistance.12 Despite all
the aid provided by the USSR to Afghanistan, the People’s Democratic Party
of Afghanistan (PDPA) regime failed to promote the Soviet’s agenda in
Afghanistan.13 This led to the frequent change of presidents and the end of
the monarchy system in Afghanistan.14 The resulting unstable political
situation provided the opportunity for the USSR to convert its cooperation
into an occupation in December 1979.15 The USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan
was the largest Soviet military action since World War II.16 On the one hand,
the USSR’s invasion was the climax of the Cold War, where tensions reached
a peak; on the other hand, it was a strategic challenge for the Western bloc.
According to David N. Gibbs, Professor of History at the University of
Arizona, President Jimmy Carter considered the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan a solemn challenge to the West and considered it “the greatest
threat to peace since second World War[.]”17
The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan exposed the tense relations between
the superpowers.18 If this was the USSR’s first attempt to use military power
to expand its territory since World War II, it was also the first time the

12

BBC NEWS, supra note 5.
Id.; The PDPA was a socialist political party in Afghanistan and was strongly supported
by the Soviet communist government. It was established on June 1, 1965, and in 1967 split
in to two factions, “Khalq” and “Parcham.” As a minority, the party assisted former Prime
Minister Daud Khan in overthrowing King Zahir Shah and established the Republic of
Afghanistan. In 1978, the party also seized power from Daud Khan during the Saur
Revolution with the help of the Afghan National Army. Beverly Male, REVOLUTIONARY
AFGHANISTAN
25,
29,
33,
35,
39,
50
(1982),
https://www.marxists.org/history/afghanistan/archive/revolutionary-afghanistan.pdf.
14
BBC NEWS, supra note 5.
15
Payind, supra note 8, at 107.
16
David Gibbs, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Retrospect,37 INT’L POL.233, 233
(June 2000),
http://dgibbs.faculty.arizona.edu/sites/dgibbs.faculty.arizona.edu/files/afghan-ip.pdf.
17
Id.
18
Payind, supra note 8, at 107.
13

VOLUME 15 • ISSUE 3 • 2017

595

596 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

superpowers’ exposition of military force led to a mass exodus of Afghans. 19
The resulting political instability, “Clash of the Titans” (superpowers), failure
of the PDPA, Soviet invasion, weak rule of law, fall of Najib’s government,
civil war, Talibanization, and U.S. intervention were all critical factors in
making Afghanistan the most unstable area in the region. 20 This dreadful
situation left the population of Afghanistan in tatters for an indefinite period
of time.
The victory and the victor are still undefined in Afghanistan; however, the
mass destruction in the country brought chaos to every level in Afghanistan.
The turmoil compelled millions of Afghans to seek refuge in the neighboring
countries of Iran and Pakistan.21 Such a mass influx drew an image of human
and societal insecurity.22 The causal factors of this massive displacement are
explained in the section below regarding the Afghan refugees’ crisis timeline
in Pakistan.

II. DISPLACEMENT IN THE MODERN HISTORY OF SOUTH ASIA
To contextualize the particular case of Afghan refugees, it is important to
describe the history of forced migration in the region. The South Asian region
has been exposed to some of the largest population displacements in recent
history as a result of “the reorganization of political communities.”23
According to Susanne Schmeidl, a Lecturer in Development Studies at the

19

Id.
“Talibanization” is a term used for the rise of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. It
was also referred to as a regime when the Taliban defeated the ruling Mujahideen
factions and seized control over Afghanistan in 1996 until 2001. The Taliban is a
fundamentalist Islamic group in Afghanistan and western Pakistan and known for its
military activities, strict codes, human rights violations, and for the forced imposition of
Islamic Sharia Law. Razia Sultana, A Study of Talibanization in Pakistan, XXIX (2) J. OF
HIST, & CULTURE, 119, 133 (2008)
21
Susanne Schmeidl, (Human) Security Dilemmas: Long-term Implications of the
Afghan Refugee Crisis, 23 THIRD WORLD Q. 8 (2002),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993574.
22
Id. at 7.
23
Id. at 8.
20
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University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia, in this process of
reorganization, the effect is sometimes immediate and fast, such as in the case
of Bangladesh.24 On the other hand, in cases like Afghanistan and Kashmir
the effect has remained protracted and stagnant. However, all of these cases
do share the unfortunate common ground of resulting from the mishandling
of power politics, political volatility, and the presence of political mistakes
leading to massive forced displacements in the region.
The first massive displacement in recent history was in the aftermath of the
subcontinent’s partition in August 1947.25 The partition was an attempt to
create two states based on religious lines, one for Hindus (India) and the other
for Muslims (Pakistan), leading to a demographic imbalance in many areas
of the newly established states.26 The communal violence in the wake of that
partition resulted in massive bloodshed, as well as the exodus of millions of
Muslims and Hindus in opposite directions.27 The period of carnage and
mayhem was just before the creation of the UNHCR in 1951.28 Prior to 1951,
approximately 14 million people were displaced, which at the time was most
likely “the largest and most concentrated” forced displacement in modern
history.29 The lack of attention and willpower by the West and the
international community was quite clear during this massive exodus, which
resulted in widespread humanitarian crises.30 Despite the frequent requests
from the newly established states, the international community gave only
modest amounts of aid to assist the displaced population, and no specialized
agency had been established.31 The partition in 1947 resulted in the
establishment of two sovereign states: India and Pakistan;32 nevertheless,
24

Id.
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 7-8
28
Id. at 8
29
Id.
30
Id. at 9
31
Id.
32
Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Influx, Humanitarian Assistance and
25
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historians consider it as one of the most violent episodes of South Asian
history.33
The second largest displacement arose due to the East Pakistan Crisis,
which led to the division of Pakistan and the creation of a new state,
Bangladesh, in December 1971.34 As a result of Pakistan’s military action,
millions of Bengalis migrated from East Pakistan to India in March 1971.35
Consequently, after the creation of Bangladesh, the non-Bengalis (known as
Beharis)—persecuted by the Bengali nationalists during the movement of the
Awami League—left the country and fled to Pakistan.36 In contrast to the first
displacement, this move captured international attention as a result of the
geopolitical interest of the West.37
The third displacement, which was the largest and most recent protracted
displacement, was the migration of Afghans to Pakistan in 1973 and onwards,
particularly to the northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the
southwestern province of Balochistan. 38 The flow initially started due to
political instability; however, the USSR’s invasion accelerated the flow in
December 1979. The displacement not only attracted a huge interest by the
international community but also led to an indirect confrontation between the
Western and Eastern bloc powers. 39 Thus, the Soviet-Afghan War was
considered a crucial and decisive phase during the Cold War.
The involvement of the USSR in the Afghan civil war between the PDPA
government (the Soviet-supported group) and the Mujahideen had disastrous

Implications
AFGHAN,
37
PAKISTAN
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41403907.
33
Schmeidl, supra note 21, at 9.
34
Rizvi, supra note 32, at 41.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Schmeidl, supra note 21, at 9.
38
Rizvi, supra note 32, at 41.
39
Schmeidl, supra note 21, at 9.
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results, creating significant turmoil for the people of Afghanistan. 40 The
situation morphed into an endless civil war that left severe, long-lasting
political fallout and had tragic effects on the people of Afghanistan and their
neighboring countries.41 Likewise, the 1979 USSR invasion had a devastating
effect on the Afghan population. The intensity of this destruction has taken
decades to overcome.42
The most recent displacement of Afghan refugees was caused by the same
level of political instability that led to the earlier displacements resulting from
the 1947 subcontinent partition and the 1971 fall of Dhaka. In terms of the
international response to these displacements, it became clear that Western
powers were only willing to act in their own political interests by limiting
their role to humanitarian assistance. The West’s minimal response to one of
the most violent displacements in the modern history of the subcontinent, the
1947 partition, highlights just how little geopolitical interest it initially held
in the subcontinent region. This contrasts greatly to the enormous political
interest generated by the USSR invasion years later and the resulting massive
humanitarian aid. This change in responsive behavior reflects the political
drivers underlying the humanitarian assistance.

III. THE EXODUS OF AFGHAN REFUGEES INTO PAKISTAN AND THE
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
The influx of refugees from Afghanistan into Pakistan has been the major
displacement of persons in the region, which created the longest running

“Mujahideen” is an Arabic word, which means those who are involved in Jihad (holy
war), which is mostly referred to as a guerilla-type war. In this article, the word
Mujahideen referred to the Afghan fighters who fought against the Soviet Union. Jihad is
allowed in Islam when an Islamic confederation feels a threat from non-Muslims. In
order to protect the Islamic confederation, Muslims are obliged to initiate Jihad upon
order of the supreme leader of the Islamic confederation. See Mujahideen,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (May 11, 2016),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/mujahideen-Islam.
41
Schmeidl, supra note 21, at 10-11.
42
Id. at 12.
40
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caseload for the refugee agency in modern history. In terms of security, this
exodus of displaced Afghans created severe economic and social
implications, not only for Afghanistan but also for the neighboring countries
of Pakistan and Iran.43 Although it went unnoticed until the Afghan refugee
numbers were at their peak, Susanne Schmeidl has managed to draw a link
between Afghan refugees and the security dilemmas in Pakistan based not
upon the size of the refugee population, but the duration of their stay.44 In
general, the security of the countries providing asylum has been linked to
refugee influxes.45 However, the high volume of Afghan refugees is not a
vital predictor of insecurity in South Asia, particularly in Pakistan. 46 Whereas
it is also well-known that security in Afghanistan is of the utmost importance
for the security of the South Asian region, particularly for Pakistan;
otherwise, the whole region would face significant challenges.47
The protracted nature of the Afghan refugee crisis creates its most obvious
dilemma. On the one hand, this protracted situation makes it a complex case;
on the other hand, it also raises questions over the effectiveness of the
UNHCR’s “Framework for Durable Solutions” for refugees.48 The situation
also emphasizes the importance of finding political solutions and selfdetermined approaches in addressing Afghan refugee problems, rather than
remaining dependent on foreign humanitarian aid.

43

Id. at 10.
Id. at 7.
45
Id. at 13.
46
Id. at 7.
47
Sanam Noor, Afghan Refugees After 9/11, 59 PAKISTAN INST. INT’L AFFAIRS 59, 62
(2006), http://www.jstor.org/stable/41394381.
48
The “Framework for Durable Solutions” for refugees and persons of concern is a
framework that aims to achieve, through development assistance for refugees,
repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development through local
integration, sharing burdens and responsibilities more equitably and building capacities to
receive and protect refugees. Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons
of Concern, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES 3 (May 2003) (on file with
author).
44
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A. Protracted Refugee Situation
When refugees have lived in exile for a period of more than five years, and
they still have no prospects of finding a durable solution to their plight, their
situation can be termed a “protracted refugee situation”.49
To understand the nature of Afghan refugee situation, it is important to be
familiar with the term protracted refugee situation. According to the
UNHCR, the term was introduced to the international policy and research
agenda in 2000 and 2001.50 The term was defined by the UNHCR as:
One in which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and
intractable state of limbo. Their lives may not be at risk, but their
basic rights and social, psychological and essential needs remain
unfulfilled after years in exile. A refugee in this situation is often
unable to break free from enforced reliance on external assistance.51
The unstoppable influx of Afghan refugees’ to Pakistan started in May
1978.52 One opinion documents an average, 44,118 individuals had taken
refuge between May 1978 and December 1983,53 whilst, in another opinion,
the influx of Afghan refugees in Pakistan had risen from 12,000 in November
1978 to 462,000 in January 1980.54 Initially, Pakistan did not realize the
magnitude of the exodus; however, it soon realized the scope of the Afghan
influx, and requested international assistance in April 1979.55 After two
assessment missions, the UNHCR established an office in Islamabad in
Nasreen Ghufran, Afghans in Pakistan: A ‘Protracted Refugee Situation’, POL’Y
PERSPECTIVES 117 (Apr. 2008),
http://www.jstor.org.proxy.seattleu.edu/stable/pdf/42909537.pdf.
50
The State of the World’s Refugees 2006: Human Displacement in the New Millennium,
U.N. HIGH COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES 121 (2006),
http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/4444afcb0.pdf.
51
Executive Comm. of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Standing Committee, 30 th
Meeting, Protracted Refugee Situations, ¶3, U.N. Doc. EC/54/SC/CRP.14 (June 10,
2004), http://www.unhcr.org/40c982172.pdf.
52
Rizvi, supra note 32, at 41.
53
Id.
54
Noor, supra note 47, at 62.
55
Id.
49
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October of 1979, and raised 15 million dollars to assist Afghan refugees.56
Additionally, in 1980 the UN agency, keeping in mind the gateway of the
influx, opened its Sub Office (SO) in Peshawar, the capital of the Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan. 57 In the context of the refugee influx, the
UNHCR SO in Peshawar recorded that the influx was accelerated by the
Soviet invasion, which had reached two million in 1981.58 While estimates
may differ regarding the number of Afghan refugees who started pouring into
Pakistan, an interesting commonality among all the sources is that the influx
of refugees in Pakistan is directly correlated with the tensions in Afghanistan
during the first decade of displacement.59
1. Timeline of Afghan Refugee Crises
Since the 1970s, Pakistan has experienced several waves of refugees as a
tragic consequence of over 30 years of conflict in Afghanistan. The intensity
of the waves was contingent upon the uproar and strife in Afghanistan. 60 The
intensity of the turbulence in Afghanistan was too high to affect the whole
region; however, its impact on Pakistan was, and is, quite visible because of
the geography and similar demographics of the conflicted (Afghanistan) and
the host (Pakistan) countries, particularly in the border areas. 61 In order to
understand the various movements of refugees into Pakistan, it is important
to know about the Durand Line, the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan
that was drawn in 1893.62 Afghanistan shares a border with Pakistan in the
east and south, Iran in the west, China in the northeast, and Turkmenistan,

56

Id.
Id. at 63.
58
Id.
59
Rizvi, supra note 32, at 41.
60
Id.
61
Noor, supra note 47, at 61-62.
62
Ijaz Hussain, The Durand Agreement in the Light of Certain Recent International
Conventions, 18 NOMOS VERLAGSGESELLSCHAFTMBHVERLAGSGESELLSCHAFTMBH255,
255 (1985) (Available at
http://www.jstor.org.proxy.seattleu.edu/stable/pdf/43109459.pdf.)
57
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Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in the north. 63 The Durand Line is the longest
border of both Afghanistan and Pakistan (1,200 miles approximately), and
also the most dangerous and porous.64 From both historical and modern
geopolitical and geostrategic perspectives, the Durand Line border has held
huge strategic importance not only for both Afghanistan and Pakistan but also
for the super-powers. It is impossible for both Afghanistan and Pakistan to
monitor and control the movements of persons, especially refugees, through
the border.65 The creation of the Durand Line led to the division of major
ethnicities, Baloch and Pashtuns.66 During the displacement of Afghans, most
of the displaced population from the eastern and northeastern provinces, such
as Kunar, Kunduz, and Nangarhar, took refuge in the northwestern province
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa of Pakistan.67 Similarly, the religious ethnicities of
Afghan refugees also played a vital role in determining their eventual
destinations.68 For example, the Persian Shia-Muslims moved to Iran, whilst
the Pashto-speaking Sunni-Muslims settled in the province of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa of Pakistan.69
The various crises in Afghanistan compelled the people of Afghanistan to
flee several times for refuge in the neighboring countries, mostly Pakistan
and Iran. As a result of various awful crises in Afghanistan, the different
influxes of refugees into Pakistan have been recorded as different historical
phases:

63

Noor, supra note 47, at 61.
Study on Cross Border Population Movements Between Afghanistan and Pakistan,
U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES 5, 13 (July 2009),
http://www.unhcr.org/4ad448670.pdf.
65
Id. at 5, 13.
66
Id. at 13.
67
Mehmet Ali Emir Aydintan, Soviet-Afghan War: The Factors Beneaththe Invasion
133 (Sept. 2013),
http://repository.bilkent.edu.tr/bitstream/handle/11693/15658/0006376.pdf?sequence=1&
isAllowed=y.
68
Noor, supra note 47, at 60-61.
69
Id. at 61.
64
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 The mass exodus of Afghan refugees to Pakistan started in 1979
as result of the military coup of 1978.70 However, the first
migration of Afghan refugees started in 1973, shortly after
Muhammad Daud Khan overthrew King Zahir Shah in a
military coup on July 17, 1973.71 Daud Khan ended the
monarchy and declared himself the first president of
Afghanistan.72 As a result of this political shift, some 1,400
“political dissidents” sought asylum in Pakistan.73 Most of these
dissidents were politically prominent and had assets and
contacts in Pakistan.74 Most of them settled in Europe and North
America, for business and family reunification purposes.75
 The second phase (1978-1988) was considered the most
prolonged phase in terms of displacement. The largest influx of
Afghan refugees started in 1978 as a result of the attempt to
establish “a socialist state.”76 The influx of Afghan refugees in
Pakistan was triggered by the “Soviet-sponsored Saur
Revolution” in 1978 and then by the USSR invasion in
December 1979.77 As a result of the Saur Revolution, Noor
Muhammad Taraki of the PDPA, with the support of Colonel
Abdul Qadir, seized power from Muhammed Daud Khan in
April of 1978.78 The political power had been equally
70

Id. at 60.
Rizvi, supra note 32, at 41 n.3.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 42-43.
75
Id.
76
Noor, supra note 47, at 60.
77
The “Saur Revolution” was a Soviet-sponsored revolution led by the PDPA against
the rule of self-proclaimed Afghan President Muhammad Daud Khan on April 27, 1978.
“SAUR,”” the Dari (Persian-language of Afghanistan) name for the second month of the
Persian calendar, is the month in which the uprising took place. Later on, the revolution
led to the 1979 intervention by the Soviets and the 1979–89 Soviet-Afghan War against
Mujahideen. Noor, supra note 47, at 62.
78
Colonel Abdul Qadir was born in Herat (Afghanistan) and trained as a pilot in the
Soviet Union. He participated in the 1973 coup of Daud Khan as well as in the coup of
Saur revolution in 1978. He remained Head of State for three days (April 28-30, 1978).
He died on April 22, 2014. Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, Ch. 5,
at 1–6 (Duke U. Press, 1985) http://online.sfsu.edu/mroozbeh/CLASS/H-606pdfs/Af&USSR.
71
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distributed among the two factions of the PDPA(Khalq and
Parcham).79 As a head of state in 1978, Noor Muhammad
Taraki introduced various reforms that faced huge opposition
by traditional Afghans.80 Many parties were involved as the
opposition reached its peak, including:Mujahideen, tribal
factions, intellectuals, who had declared a common enemy, the
USSR and the Soviet-sponsored PDPA, which were finally
suppressed by the U.S.-led military intervention in Afghanistan
in 2001.81 It was considered the most intensified phase,
becausethe intensity of the destruction in Afghanistan was
directly correlated with the massive influx of refugees in the
neighboring countries of Pakistan and Iran.82 As noted above,
according to the UNHCR SO Peshawar, the refugee population
reached to two million in Pakistan, when more than one million
refugees arrived at the northwestern province of Pakistan
(Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) in 1981.83 However, from another view,
by 1983 the number of Afghan refugees reached 3.9 million in
the neighboring countries of Pakistan and Iran.84 The high
volume of refugees provided not only the justification for the
intensified conflict in Afghanistan, but it also unleashed the
facts regarding colossal involvement of the Western and
Eastern blocs in the crucial and decisive phase of the Cold War.
During this phase, the UNHCR had also opened its sub-office
in Peshawar (Pakistan) in 1980.85
 Phase three (1989-1995) started with the withdrawal of Soviet
troops, but also with a wave of massacre, civil war, and
79

Khalq and Parcham were the two factions of the PDPA. Khalq was led by Noor
Muhammad Taraki and Parcham was led by Babrak Karmal. Rizvi, supra note 32, at 4142.
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Noor, supra note 47, at 60.
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Id. at 60.
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https://www.irinnews.org/news/2012/02/27/timeline-afghan-displacements-pakistan
[hereinafter Timeline].
84
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factional fighting.86 Despite the chaos created by the fight
between Najib’s government and Mujahideen fighters,
repatriation was also an ongoing process. 87 Nonetheless, this
phase saw a perplexing migration trend.88 While those who fled
due to the Soviet invasion repatriated, the victims of the civil
war took refuge in Pakistan.89 Despite the outflow, the number
of refugees in Pakistan stayed high. 90 The conquest of Kabul
(defeat of the communist-sponsored government of Najib) by
the Mujahideen raised the curve of repatriation, and, within six
months, 1.2 million Afghans were repatriated in 1992.91
However, the curve did not maintain its trend because the war
did not come to an end for another four years, until 1996.92
Subsequently, the failure of powersharing between the different
factions of Mujahideen dragged Afghanistan into another
devastating phase of the war.93 According to the UNHCR SO
Peshawar, 74,000 refugees arrived in Pakistan following infighting between Hezb-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Islami (different
factions of Mujahideen) for the control of Afghanistan. 94 To
settle this new influx of Afghan refugees, 334 refugee camps
were established in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, and
Balochistan provinces of Pakistan. 95
 The fourth phase (1996-2001) revolved around the emergence
of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan. According to the
UNHCR SO Peshawar, in 1996, 50,000 Afghan refugees
arrived in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan
following the fall of the cities of Kabul and Jalalabad to the
Taliban.96 During this phase, the various factions of the
Mujahideen grouped together “to form the United Front” to
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
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combat the Taliban”; yet the Taliban took control of over 90
percent of Afghanistan’s territory in 1996.97 However, the fight
between the Taliban and the newly established Northern
Alliance (an alliance of some of the former Mujahideen
factions) ended in 1999 upon the fall of the northern Afghan
city of Mazar-e-Sharif to the Taliban regime, which led to a new
influx of refugees in Pakistan.98 With the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif,
the Taliban completely took over Afghanistan, which
compelled thousands of refugees to enter and reenter (recyclers)
in Pakistan.99 According to UNHCR SO Quetta, 30,000
refugees, mostly ethnic Hazaras, fled to Balochistan
(southwestern province of Pakistan) fearing discrimination and
persecution.100 According to Schemeidl, the tenure of the
Taliban was somehow credited with restoring law and order and
upholding the security situation.101 However, historians will
never forget the brutality, bloodshed of the religious minorities,
violations of women’s rights, strict code for the imposition of
Islamic Sharia law, and ill treatment with the educated and
moderate politicians. Furthermore, during this particular phase,
Afghanistan also faced the worst drought in past 30 years. 102
The situation caused many Afghans to be displaced
internally.103
 Phase 5 (2001-2002) started with the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
which was followed by the US-escorted military invasion of
Afghanistan and the fall of the Taliban regime. Around 1.5
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million Afghans left their homes,104 whereas 3,000-3,400
civilian deaths were recorded as a result of the aerial
bombardments during the first 20 weeks of the invasion.105 This
era also experienced anti-Pashtun violence in western and
northern Afghanistan.106According to the UNHCR SO
Peshawar, due to the US-led military invasion, about 60,000
new Afghan refugees arrived in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan
and camped in nine new refugee villages. 107 Moreover, this
fresh wave of Afghan refugees contributed to the total figure of
five million Afghans who have crossed into Pakistan since
1979.108

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION OF AFGHAN REFUGEES IN
PAKISTAN
A. The Response to Afghans in Pakistan
The Durand Line divided the territory between the Indian subcontinent and
Afghanistan; however, the strong religious, ethnic, and linguistic ties among
the Pashtuns living on both sides of the border kept this border between
Afghanistan and Pakistan as extremely porous.109 There is a long history of
mobility between the Pashtuns of eastern Afghanistan and those living in the
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Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. 110 Various Pashtun tribes living
on both sides of the border did not accept the Durand Line as an international
border.111 In this context, those Afghans who entered the territory of Pakistan
as a result of the first military coup in 1973, sought refuge in their relatives’
houses.112
1. The Response of the Government of Pakistan
In 1978, when the Afghan families initially started pouring in to Pakistan
seeking refuge, the provincial governments and local administrations of
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan received them.113 As these two
provinces of Pakistan share borders with Afghanistan, and the majority of the
influx was also Pashtun, these two provinces became the main hosts of
Afghan refugees.114 In April 1978, because of the military coup of Noor
Muhammad Taraki, followed by the Soviet invasion in 1979, the exodus of
Afghan families exceeded the handling capacity of the local administration
and provincial governments.115 In this regard, the subject of the Afghan influx
in Pakistan was assigned to the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions
(SAFRON) in early 1980, upon the special direction of the President of
Pakistan.116
Assigning the special responsibility to the Ministry of SAFRON was a first
definite step in structuring an administrative setup for humanitarian
assistance for the Afghan influx in Pakistan. An office of the Chief
Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (CCAR) was created at the federal level
as an attached department of the Ministry of SAFRON. The CCAR office
110
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operates in four provinces of Pakistan, with four offices of Commissionerate
for Afghan refugees (CAR).117 The CCAR is mandated to coordinate with
federal and provincial governments, liaise with UN agencies and
humanitarian organizations, engage in policy planning for Afghan refugees,
give administrative support, and access provisions for Afghan refugees in
Pakistan.118 Some of the core functions of the CCAR office are:119
 Monitoring and evaluating programs being carried out by the
international organizations and the Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) through periodic visits and inspections.
 Maintaining and generating statistics with the collaboration of
the UNHCR and coordinating relief work between the federal
government and provincial governments.
 Issuance of Non Objection Certificates (NOCs) to NGOs for
operations and access to Refugee Villages or Camps (RVs) and
urban settlements.
 Provision of required data and assistance in operations to
humanitarian actors and aid agencies.
 Maintenance of close liaison with national and international aidgiving agencies and documentation of the relief assistance.
 Streamlining and standardizing procedures and methods of
distribution of aid for Afghan Refugees down to the lowest level.
 Maintaining warehouses funded by the UNHCR.
 Coordinating repatriation of Afghan Refugees.
 Raising awareness and ensuring induction of Afghan refugees in
various assistance and empowerment programs.
Since the creation of CAR offices, the government of Pakistan has brought
changes to these offices as required in various situations. Initially, these
offices played a vital role in assisting the aid agencies by providing human
resources and making bulk distributions in the refugee camps.120 However,
there has been a shift by widening the scope of operations in managing
117
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Afghan refugee camps and ensuring the involvement of Afghan refugees in
implementing assistance programs. Along these lines, developments included
the establishment of the Repatriation Cell in 1987 and the Community
Development Unit (CDU).121 In February 2016, a Solutions Strategy Unit
was established within the commisionerate office by merging the
Repatriation and Education cells, with additional responsibilities assigned to
this newly established unit.122 The Refugees Affected and Hosting Areas
(RAHA) unit within the CAR office has also been established under one of
the pillars of the Solution Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR).123 The
RAHA program aims to balance the social, economic, and environmental
consequences of the presence of Afghan refugees over the past 37 years in
Pakistan.124
2. Cooperation Agreement Between the UNHCR and the Government
of Pakistan
According to UN General Assembly Resolution 428 (V) of December14,
1950, the High Commissioner for Refugees is mandated with providing
international protection and seeking permanent solutions for refugees by
assisting governments.125 Despite hosting millions of Afghan refugees over
the course of 37 years, Pakistan still lacks a national legal framework to
determine the status of refugees.126 In this regard, the government of Pakistan
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and the UNHCR signed an Agreement of Cooperation in Islamabad on
September 18, 1993.127 According to this agreement, Pakistan generally
allows asylees to remain in Pakistan, based on the UNHCR decisions on
refugee status determination for identification of durable solutions. 128 The
purpose of the agreement is to cooperate with the government of Pakistan
within the mandate of the UNHCR. According to Article II of the agreement,
the UNHCR shall open offices in the country and carry out its international
protection and humanitarian assistance functions in favor of refugees and
other persons of its concern in the host country.129 Furthermore, in accordance
with the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN
organizations, which was implemented in Pakistan under the Act of 1948,
privileges and immunities were granted to the UNHCR under Article IX of
the cooperation agreement.130 In addition, the terms, the conditions, and the
scope of the authorities were brought into force, including procedures for
terminating the agreement for both parties.
B. The Legal Status of Afghan Refugees and Various Shifts in Their Status
in Pakistan
To date, Pakistan is a signatory of neither the Refugee Convention of 1951
nor the additional protocols of 1967; however, the Afghan population that
arrived in Pakistan post-1979 has de facto been considered prima facie
refugees.131 Initially, when the exodus began, the status of Mohajerin was
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given to the Afghans, and Pakistan adopted an open-door policy.132 The
hosting of Afghan refugees has never been viewed as a legal obligation, but
as a humanitarian and religious duty. 133 In this regard, the Afghans received
the privilege of hospitality, one of the honor codes of Pashtun culture,
because the concentration of Afghan refugees was in the provinces of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan of Pakistan.134
Pakistan lacks established procedures to determine the refugee status in its
territory because of the absence of a legal instrument at the national level to
protect refugees.135 However, the 1946 Foreigner’s Act of Pakistan presents
a legal framework for its immigration policy. 136According to the Act, those
who want to enter into the territory of Pakistan must have a valid travel
document and a visa.137 The response of Pakistan to Afghan refugees has been
largely consistent with norms in refugee law since the exodus started in 1979;
however, even after the provision of prima facie status, certain Afghans still
remain under the scope of the Foreigner’s Act. 138
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The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989 decreased
Western donors’ interest in Afghan refugees in Pakistan, bringing about a
policy shift in which the government of Pakistan granted refugee status on a
prima facie basis.139 In the 1980s, identity or ration passes had been issued to
Afghan families.140 These passes entitled the Afghan families to get
assistance, including food; however, the passes did not provide legal
protection in the form of legal status and were used merely for getting
assistance.141 The withdrawal of Soviet troops in February 1989 created the
grounds for repatriation.142 At that time, an assisted repatriation program was
started by the encashment of ration passes in 1992.143 The process of
encashment of ration passes was practiced until 1995, and in the same year,
the ration passes were stopped, and the refugees were no longer entitled to
get assistance.144 This change in policy created complications to the return
process and left the Afghan families in a miserable and vulnerable situation;
later on, which added more to the identity crises of Afghans in Pakistan.
In 1995, humanitarian assistance decreased when ration cards ceased to be
effective in providing rations.145 This created a perplexing situation regarding
the status of Afghans in Pakistan. This scenario fashioned an ambiguous
situation not only for the Afghan families in Pakistan, but also for the
humanitarian actors. In order to contextualize the whole situation, the
Secretary of the then Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas and States and
Frontier Regions Division (now Ministry of SAFRON) issued a letter in July
1997 to the Ministry of Interior regarding the status of Afghan refugees in
Pakistan, stating,

139

Turton & Marsden, supra note 132, at 12.
Id.at 12.
141
Id. at 15.
142
Id. at 12.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 13.
145
Id.
140

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

The Odyssey of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan

During the temporary stay of the Afghan Refugees in Pakistan all
laws applicable to the local citizens shall apply to the Afghan
Refugees. However, as the Government of Pakistan has provided
refuge to the Afghan refugees on humanitarian grounds, the
provisions of the Foreigners Registration Act and other such rules
pertaining to foreigners residing in Pakistan do not apply to the
Afghan refugees.
All along their stay, the Afghan Refugees have never been confined
to the camps. The above is also necessitated by the fact that almost
all the food and other assistance previously provided by the
international agencies, has been discontinued w.e.f. October 1995.
The Afghan Refugees have, therefore, to earn their livelihood
outside the camps in Pakistan to support themselves as well as their
families. The movement/presence of Afghan refugees outside the
refugee camps is, therefore, legitimate. 146
While the above-mentioned letter was a clear statement by the government
of Pakistan, it also clarified the lack of humanitarian assistance and interest
from the West. The statement by the government of Pakistan had given
freedom of movement, but, on the other hand, the movement of Afghan
refugees from camps to urban settlements created a huge issue in tracing
records; later, it became a vital contributor in making the Afghan caseload a
protracted refugee case.147
1. Era of Ambiguous Identity or Identity Crises
The urbanization of Afghan refugees created confusion beginning in the
mid 1990’s, when the urbanization of Afghan families was legitimized, until
the first ever census of Afghan families in Pakistan in 2005.148 Despite the
legalization of the stay of Afghan families in urban settlements, as a result of
The Secretary Ministry of Interior, Status of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, GOV’T
PAKISTAN (July 1997) (on file with author).
147
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file with author) [hereinafter Working Paper].
148
Afghans in Pakistan: Broadening the Focus, supra note 137, at 3.
146

VOLUME 15 • ISSUE 3 • 2017

615

616 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

the discontinuation of the aid programs and the exemption from the
Foreigners Act of Pakistan, the Afghans faced exploitation in the urban
settlements.149 During this particular phase, the UNHCR’s stance on the
provision of protection to Afghans in urban areas was unclear. 150 One of the
vital factors in this reluctance was the absence of statistics on Afghans living
in the urban settlements.151 They were exposed and subjected to the
Foreigners Act of 1946.152 During this time, when the Afghans living in
Pakistan were struggling with the crises related to their ambiguous status,
Pakistan was receiving a new wave of Afghans as a result of the fall of the
northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan in 1999, during the Taliban
regime.153 Furthermore, the influx of Afghan families increased as result of
one of the worst droughts in Afghanistan’s history.154 As a result of this new
wave, the term economic migrant was introduced. Additionally, the
government of Pakistan had halted the prima facie refugee status for the new
influx of refugees.155 The influx of Afghans in the late 1990s and in 2000
complicated the ambiguous status of those who were already staying in
Pakistan. On the other hand, the government of Pakistan clearly expressed
asylum fatigue.
In 2001, after the US-led military invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan
became a hub of Afghans with different status and labels, based on their
arrival timeframes in Pakistan.156 These labels included mohajireen, refugees
with prima facie status, economic migrants, illegal immigrants, and migrant
workers.157 However, it was difficult to differentiate these various categories
149
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of Afghan families in Pakistan and to determine the status and level of
persecution.
2. Registration of Afghans in Pakistan
The scenario discussed regarding ambiguous identity in the section “Status
of Afghans in Pakistan” had arisen because of the absence of accurate data
on Afghan families living in Pakistan.158 Admittedly, it was a difficult task to
collect data on Afghans, given that the back-and-forth movements between
the countries of asylum and origin were a common practice and were
recorded on a daily basis.159 However, the fact that there was a war going on
in a neighboring country with which Pakistan shares a

1200-mile

(approximately) long porous border raised serious concerns over Pakistan’s
internal security.160 On December 17, 2004, the government of Pakistan and
the UNHCR signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) UNHCR to
organize a census and register the Afghans living in Pakistan.161 In order to
operationalize the MoU, the government of Pakistan was represented by the
Ministry of SAFRON and the Ministry of Interior, whereas the UNHCR was
represented by the UNHCR representation in Pakistan. 162 The first ever
census of Afghans living in Pakistan was conducted in February and March
of 2005, and had two objectives: (1) To issue basic identity documentation in
the form of a Proof of Registration (PoR) to each individual of the target
population over five years of age who was temporarily living in Pakistan, and
(2): To supplement ongoing data collection and analysis required for the
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further developments of arrangements for the management of Afghan citizens
temporarily living in Pakistan. 163
Following a census, the registration of Afghans began in 2006.164
According to the MoU, the UNHCR would ensure funds of $5.995 million
for the registration of Afghans in Pakistan.165 The National Authority for Data
and Registration (NADRA) was assigned to issue computerized identity
documents capable of storing electronic data.166 The Government of Pakistan
and UNHCR mutually agreed that the target of the registration would be
Afghan citizens who entered Pakistan or were born in Pakistan after
December 1, 1979.167 Furthermore, the scope of the registration process was
extended to Azad Jammu& Kashmir, and Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA).168 The registration process was planned in two phases: (1)
Analyzing data collected from the census and other relevant sources required
for the registration process in order to design the technical and financial
aspects of the planning and implementation of the registration exercise for all
Afghan citizens previously covered in the census; and (2) registration and
issuance of Proof of Registration (PoR) to each individual over five years of
age of the target population.169
Initially, the parties agreed upon a three-year validity period for the PoR
cards, which was from 2006 to 2009, and decided that extensions would be
based upon the mutual agreement of signatories of the Tripartite
agreement.170 After the expiry of PoR cards in 2009 and 2012, new cards
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were issued in 2010 and 2014, respectively.171 In July 2013, the Federal
Cabinet of Pakistan adopted a National Policy on Management and
Repatriation of Afghan Refugees and extended the validity of PoR cards and
the Tripartite Agreement on Voluntary Repatriation, until December 31,
2015.172 In this context, a nationwide PoR card renewal exercise was
completed in February 2015 with the support of the UNHCR. 173 A total of
1,208,632 PoR cardholders, 93 percent of the total registered Afghan refugee
population in Pakistan, were issued new cards that were valid until December
31, 2015.174 Besides that, as of August 2015, six Proof of Registration Card
Modification (PCM) centers registered some 62,000 births of children to
Afghan refugees.175 A special helpline, mass information campaigns, and
SMS services were also provided in support of the renewal process.176 After
the expiry of PoR cards in December 2015, the Ministry of SAFRON
extended the validity of the existing PoR cards thrice in the year 2016.177 The
current PoR cards are valid until December 31, 2017, as a result of a
notification issued on February 22, 2017, by the Ministry of SAFRON.178 The
extension will be reviewed in the final quarter of 2017 for continuation of the
legal stay of Afghan refugees and will be based on the mutual agreement of
the signatories’ of Tripartite agreement.179
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It is important to know about some of the entitlements of a PoR card and
the legal status of the PoR card bearers, which are 180
 The PoR card is an identity document and entitles the cardholder
to legally remain in Pakistan until the expiry of the card. The
card is valid throughout Pakistan.
 Every registered Afghan must carry the new PoR card and
present it to law enforcement agencies on demand.
 PoR cardholders have the right to reside in Pakistan and cannot
be arrested under the 1946 Foreigners Act. However, the PoR
card does not give immunity from criminal prosecution if bearers
are involved in criminal activities or breach any other Pakistan’s
law.
 The PoR card is not a travel document and does not allow its
holder to cross international borders, including between Pakistan
and Afghanistan.
The government of Pakistan and the UNHCR agreed that the PoR card
would carry only personal biographical data. The card would also legitimize
the temporary stay of the cardholder as Afghan citizen in Pakistan.181
The issuance of PoR cards was vital not only for having statistical records
regarding Afghan families in Pakistan but also for putting the legal presence
of these families in writing. With these developments, a few missing links
were also observed in some key areas regarding entitlements attached to PoR
cards. During the announcement regarding urbanization of Afghan refugees
in July 1997, it was quite clear that Afghan refugees in Pakistan would not
be confined to camps and would be allowed to earn livelihoods.182 However,

180
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Clause 4, Section 3 of the MoU clearly stated that the PoR card does not grant
a right to work or work authorization in Pakistan. 183 This statement meant
that those Afghan refugees who were living legally in Pakistan were not
allowed to work. The ad hoc nature of the various announcements,
notifications, and policies kept the Afghan refugees in Pakistan in a state of
continuous uncertainty. However, with the ongoing advocacy by
humanitarian organizations and the UNHCR, various developments have
been observed regarding entitlements of PoR cards in Pakistan. In this regard,
after the extension of PoR cards until December 2015, the Ministry of
SAFRON allowed PoR cardholders to use their cards to open bank accounts,
receive driving licenses, and obtain SIM cards. 184 This step from the
government of Pakistan received a loud applause from humanitarian actors
including UN agencies as well.
C. Durable Solutions and Its Status in Pakistan
The UNHCR is mandated to provide international protection.185 The
ultimate aim of refugee protection is to secure permanent solutions for
refugees. Finding durable solutions has always been a difficult task in
protracted refugee situations and particularly in a case where the back-andforth movement between countries of asylum and origin is a common
practice.186 The majority of the current Afghan refugee population was born
in Pakistan and has never experienced a life in Afghanistan.187 Article 1 of
the UNHCR Statute outlines durable solutions for refugees under two distinct
captions, which are voluntary repatriation and assimilation into new national
183
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communities.188 Assimilation into new national communities can take two
forms: (1) local integration in the country of first asylum, or (2) resettlement
in a third country.189
Local integration is the integration of refugees in the country of first
asylum or principal state of asylum. 190 Pakistan is a signatory to neither the
Refugee Convention of 1951 nor any other refugee-related instrument
internationally. In this regard, there are no prospects of local integration for
Afghans in Pakistan. On the other hand, “resettlement is not a right and there
is no obligation on states to accept refugees for resettlement.”191 It is the
equitable sharing of responsibilities to settle the refugees permanently in a
third country. Additionally, only extremely vulnerable refugees are eligible
for resettlement, particularly those who are unable to repatriate, stay
temporarily, or integrate in the country of first asylum. 192
The success of resettlement cases is not very high. In June 2015, the
UNHCR estimated that, globally, almost 1.15 million refugees are in need of
resettlement based on their extreme vulnerabilities; however, only 27
countries are willing to resettle refugees. 193 In addition, 86 percent of the total
resettled refugees are residing in developing countries, which evidence the
unwillingness of developed countries to share and bear the responsibility of
integrating refugees in their societies.194According to updates issued by the
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UNHCR Pakistan, the organization had submitted approximately 2,000
resettlement cases to third or resettlement countries in 2015. 195
In the legal context of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, voluntary repatriation
has always been viewed as a possible and agreeable solution not only by the
government of Pakistan, but by humanitarian actors including the UN
agencies.
D. Voluntary Repatriation Program
The UNHCR considered repatriation of Afghan refugees as a preferred
durable solution in the legal context of Pakistan. 196 However, the
sustainability of this solution, in terms of reintegrating returnees in
Afghanistan, presents a challenge for the UNHCR and the governments of
both countries (Afghanistan and Pakistan), and has also raised questions over
the credibility and durability of voluntary repatriation. The UNHCR
facilitates voluntary repatriation in Pakistan as part of its mandate. 197 The
voluntary repatriation program of Pakistan, which started in 1992, is the
world’s largest UNHCR repatriation program.198 The program had stopped in
1999 because of funding constraints; however, it resumed in 2000 and still
operates.199 The UNHCR’s voluntary repatriation program was suspended
from December 1, 2016 to February 28, 2017 for winter break. 200 This
195
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suspension was then extended until March 31, 2017, because of the closure
of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The UNHCR has recently
announced to resume its repatriation program beginning April 3, 2017.Apart
from the winter break, lack of funding was the main factor in the suspension
of the repatriation program.201 The UNHCR Pakistan facilitates the voluntary
repatriation program along with relevant government departments, including
the Commisionerate Afghan Refugees and humanitarian organizations. 202
The voluntary repatriation program of Afghan refugees in Pakistan can be
divided into two phases: (1) Pre-9/11, and (2) Post-9/11.
The Pre-9/11 phase was driven by the Soviets’ withdrawal. 203 However,
decreased funding for Afghan refugees in Pakistan was also a compelling
factor in the start of the repatriation program in 1992.204 The Pre-9/11
program was not properly structured to link the assistance (reintegration
grant) with actual repatriation.205 The Post-9/11 program was a comparatively
structured program and was based upon the lessons learned from the Pre-9/11
program.206 However, it is extremely challenging for the host country and
humanitarian organizations to facilitate, maintain, and sustain the pace of
repatriation program in a situation where back-and-forth movements of
refugees is a common practice because of the lack of reintegration drivers in
the country of origin.207
1. Pre-9/11
In February 1989, with the withdrawal of the Soviets, Mujahideen took
charge by dethroning the PDPA’s government led by Najib. 208 This scenario
201
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laid the groundwork to plan a massive repatriation program. 209 In this regard,
the UNHCR launched an assisted voluntary repatriation program. 210 In order
to be part of this program, the Afghan refugees had to show willingness to
repatriate by cancelling their passes to get a grant of $100 and 300 kg of wheat
grains as a repatriation package.211 The program also had the implicit
outcome of encashment of ration passes.212 Withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan was not the only driver of the repatriation program; additionally,
a deficit of donor interest was also a compelling factor during the 1990s.213
The 1990s repatriation program of the UNHCR incentivized the deregistration of Afghan families in the assistance books of aid agencies rather
than to support actual return.214 In short, it was less repatriation and more of
a de-registration process.215
The families who had lost almost everything in the Soviet transition
encashed their ration passes because they were in need of funds, particularly
in a situation where donor fatigue had also been expressed in the provision of
assistance. Repatriation was at its peak because of the fall of Najib’s
government and the rise of the Mujahideen regime in Afghanistan; however,
it is also worth mentioning that the number of de-registered refugees was
greater than the actual number of repatriated refugees.216 According to the
government of Pakistan, between July 1990 and early 1994, only one-third of
those refugees who showed willingness and encashed their ration passes were
actually repatriated, whereas the rest of them remained in Pakistan. 217
Encashment of ration passes was practiced until 1995, and in the same year,
the ration passes were stopped and no longer allowed holders to receive
209
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assistance from aid agencies; however, repatriation was an ongoing process
until 1999.218
The era between 1995 and 2000 was a perplexing time period not only for
Afghan refugees in terms of their status, assistance, and repatriation, but also
for the humanitarian actors and the government of Pakistan in terms of
funding insufficiency. Additionally, the uproar inside Afghanistan was also
at its peak and was directly linked to the influx in Pakistan, when the Taliban
took charge over Herat in 1995, Kabul in 1996, Mazar-e-Sharif in 1998, and
Taloqan in September 2000, which was directly linked to the influx in
Pakistan.219 Besides that, the war-affected country was brutally hit by terrible
drought, which not only raised the number of recyclers (who re-entered the
country of asylum after repatriation) in Pakistan, but also increased internal
displacement in 2000.220 During this time period, on one hand, Afghan
refugees were compelled to practice back-and-forth movements because of
the fight between various factions of Mujahideen and power politics in
Afghanistan; on the other hand, humanitarian actors were also muddled
because of the unclear status of Afghans in Pakistan and funding
insufficiency.221
2. Post-9/11
The voluntary repatriation program of the UNHCR was suspended in 1999
due to funding constraints. 222 However, even when it resumed in 2000, the
Afghan refugees did not view it as one of the preferred durable solutions, due
to the volatile security situation and worst ever drought in Afghanistan.223
Furthermore, in the wake of 9/11, the US-escorted military invasion created
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an unpredictable security situation in Afghanistan.224 In 2001, according to
the UNHCR SO Peshawar, this scenario made Khyber Pakhtunkhwa the host
of 60,000 newly arrived refugees, which contributed to the total figure of five
million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. 225
In December 2001, the transitional government in Afghanistan created
hopes for a secure and conducive environment for repatriation to
Afghanistan.226 Later, in June 2002, as a result of the Loya Jirga (grand
assembly), the appointment of Hamid Karzai as interim president was one of
the decisive moments for Afghan refugees to rethink of repatriation as a
durable solution.227 These measures acted as a pull factor in Afghanistan and
created grounds for a voluntary repatriation program in Pakistan. 228 In
September 2002, the UNHCR claimed the single largest assisted repatriation
since 1972, which included almost 1.63 million persons. 229 This time, the
UNHCR approached the challenge with a well-designed, systematic, and
more structured repatriation program.
In 2002, the UNHCR established Voluntary Repatriation Centers (VRCs)
in Pakistan to facilitate the return process and to ensure that repatriation was
voluntary, dignified, and in accordance with international standards.230
Initially, it was planned that seven voluntary repatriation centers would be
established.231 Being a leading refugee-hosting province, two VRCs were
established in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa at Peshawar and
Timergara in the Lower Dir district, while one was established in Quetta at
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Baleli (Balochistan).232 However, later on, the VRC at Timergara was closed
because of limited use by refugees, and there were two VRCs operating in
Pakistan until August 2016. Recently, in September 2016, another VRC was
established at Azakhel (District Nowshera) to respond to the increased
number of refuges repatriating from Pakistan, the second VRC in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa province and third in the country.233
VRCs in Pakistan are facilitating refugees from camps as well as from
urban settlements.234 The procedure of de-registration from the NADRA
database and receipt of Voluntary Repatriation Form (VRF) is a step-by-step
process that was clearly explained by the UNHCR, humanitarian
organizations, and CAR staff through the distribution of brochures and
leaflets in the native languages of Afghan refugees. 235 Families who wish to
repatriate are de-registered at VRCs, where they give up their PoR cards and
receive a VRF.236 The VRF is a proof of repatriation kept by the refugees,
which also enables them to receive a cash reintegration grant for returnees
from the UNHCR at encashment centers (ECs) in Afghanistan.237
Presently, there are three ECs in Afghanistan, where returnees receive
reintegration grants upon arrival.238 Initially, the reintegration grant was $100
per person, but was later increased to $150 in March 2011 and then to $200
232
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in January 2014.239 In June 2016, the reintegration grant was increased to
$350 along with a transportation allowance of $30-70 per family member.240
The transportation allowance depends upon the distance between the
residential area in Pakistan and the final destination in Afghanistan.241 During
the months of September, October, and November of 2016, the UNHCR
spent over $130 million in terms of reintegration cash grant. 242
Recently, on the eve of resuming its repatriation program, the UNHCR has
announced to decrease the individual reintegration grant from approximately
$400 to $200.243 Apart from funding constraints, human rights organizations
critiqued the UNHCR regarding using reintegration grant as a tool for
promoting voluntary repatriation, which probably resulted in the decrease of
reintegration grant. In contrast, the UNHCR refutes the claim of the
promotion of repatriation through the raise in reintegration grant. 244 However,
it will be worth watching the pace and numbers of repatriation in 2017 and
beyond with the decreased amount of grant.
3. Tripartite Agreement
The repatriation of Afghan refugees is guided by the principle of
voluntarism, as embedded in the Tripartite Agreement, initially signed
between the Government of Pakistan, the Government of Afghanistan, and
the UNHCR in 2003 at Brussels.245 After being extended several times, the
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agreement was recently extended until December 31, 2017.246 In the
agreement, the parties recognized voluntary repatriation as a preferred
durable solution; however, the return should be dignified and framed in the
context of the security situation in Afghanistan.247
The agreement focused on establishing a framework to cooperate, plan,
and implement coordinated programs for voluntary repatriation of Afghan
citizens in Pakistan with the support of the international community. 248 The
agreement has 28 articles.249 Article 1 of the agreement established a
“Tripartite Commission” among signatories of the agreement. 250 The
Tripartite Commission Agreement regulates the repatriation of registered
Afghan citizens in Pakistan.251 The agreement thoroughly explained the role
and nature of the commission. Article 4 of the commission gives explanation
about meetings of the commission.252 The parties agreed that members of the
commission would meet quarterly.253
In this regard, the commission met twice in 2015. The 25 th Tripartite
Commission meeting was held on March 11, 2015, at Islamabad, and the 26th
Commission meeting was organized on August 22, 2015, at Kabul.254 At the
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25th Tripartite Commission meeting, it was noted that both governments
agreed to develop mutually reinforcing plans for the return and reintegration
in Afghanistan, as well as management of Afghan refugees in Pakistan
beyond 2015.255 At the 26th Commission, among the topics emphasized were
the need for regular exchange of information between governments, crossborder cooperation on livelihood interventions, and prioritization of returnees
by the Government of Afghanistan under its new comprehensive voluntary
repatriation and reintegration plan.256 The participants also focused on a
comprehensive repatriation package such as an Enhanced Voluntary Return
and Reintegration Package (EVRP), to ensure sustainable reintegration of
returnees in Afghanistan.257 Furthermore, the Minister of SAFRON
emphasized continued investment in RAHA (Refugee Affected and Hosting
Area Program) projects which will enable Pakistan to host Afghan refugees
by preserving asylum space in the country. 258 On July 19, 2016, the
Commission meeting was held at Bhurban, Pakistan.259 The meeting
concluded with the parties reiterating their commitment of the safe, dignified,
and voluntary repatriation as the best solution to end the protracted refugee
situation in Pakistan.260 Pakistan further urged the importance of immediate,
concrete, and tangible reintegration measures in Afghanistan for the expected
high returns due to the enhanced repatriation grant. 261 Additionally, the
255
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parties reaffirmed their commitment to uphold the letter and spirit of the
SSAR, as a regional framework and platform for coordinated actions to
identify and implement lasting solutions for Afghan refugees.262 Besides that,
the need for international solidarity, equitable responsibility sharing,
development investment, and active engagement was also focused on, to end
the chapter of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. 263
The 28th Tripartite Commission meeting was held in Islamabad, Pakistan
on February 15, 2017.264 All parties of the commission welcomed the new
national policy of the Government of Pakistan regarding management of the
Afghan refugees and Afghan nationals living in Pakistan. 265 The policy
includes (1) extension of Proof of Registration (PoR) cards and the Tripartite
Agreement until December 31, 2017; (2) approval of a visa regime for
different

categories

businessmen/traders,

of

Afghan

skilled/unskilled

refugees

including

students,

laborers,

intermarriages,

and

healthcare; (3) commitment to adoption of a national refugee law, including
agreement to document the undocumented Afghan refugees; and (4)
improvement in border management. 266 All the parties reaffirmed their
commitment to uphold the principle of voluntarism in repatriation under the
Tripartite Agreement as well as to pursue and implement lasting solutions for
Afghan refugees within the regional framework of SSAR.267 The participants
agreed that the Afghanistan government would host the 29th Tripartite
Commission meeting during the year 2017.268
The agreement is a complete document that not only upholds the
commitment of its signatories regarding dignified voluntary repatriation as a
preferred durable solution, but also defines the supervisory role of the
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UNHCR, including movement and security of the UNHCR staff. 269 The
document covers almost all the aspects involved in the repatriation of
registered Afghan citizens in Pakistan. The agreement not only covers the
international access to Afghan citizens before and after repatriation but also
focuses on the preservation of family unity (Article 16), special measures for
vulnerable groups (Article 17), and immigration, customs, and health
formalities (Article 19).270 However, the effectiveness of this agreement is
directly contingent upon the commitment, seriousness, and dedication of both
governments towards making extraordinary efforts for the dignified,
voluntary return and sustainable reintegration in Afghanistan.
4. Voluntary Repatriation Process and Facilitation at VRCs
The UNHCR assists voluntary repatriation in three VRCs (Voluntary
Repatriation Centers) in Pakistan, and offers this assistance with relevant
government authorities and implementing partners including CAR, NADRA,
Project Directorate Health (PDH), and the Ministry of Refugees and
Repatriation (MoRR).271 VRC Chamkani at Peshawar has the ability to
process approximately 1,800 refugees per day, and all the VRCs deal with
only registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan. 272
VRCs have been equipped with the latest biometric technology.273 It has
been observed that the repatriation process has been equipped with passage
of time, and new technologies were introduced in the UNHCR’s VRCs to
cover the gaps in the repatriation process. In 2002, when repatriation was at
its peak, the issue of recyclers emerged as a challenge for the UNHCR. Those
families that had repatriated reentered in Pakistan and invoked the same
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process to re-earn the cash grant.274 As of 2002, there was no record of
Afghan families in the NADRA database.275 In this situation, an Iris
recognition test was introduced to ensure the secure receipt of cash grants, as
well as to prevent recycling.276 The technology enabled the UNHCR to trace
the recyclers. It was vital to maintain authenticity and accuracy in records of
repatriated families to make it more transparent, as well as accessible for the
authorities involved in the process. Those registered Afghan refugees who
underwent the Iris checks are now unable to get cash grants, even after getting
the PoR cards in 2006.277 The following are the various facilitation steps to
process Afghan refugees for voluntary repatriation at VRCs:278
 Verification: To check authenticity of PoR cards, verify family
composition, ensure a free and informed decision to return, and
check vulnerability of persons requiring special attention;
i. De-registration—individual refugee is checked against
the Afghan Citizen Registration (ACR) biometric database
and is de-registered.
ii. Iris Recognition Test ensures individuals receive
repatriation assistance once; prevents re-cycling.
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 Protection Desk: Ensure protective presence in voluntary
repatriation centers to Persons of Concern (POC),) with particular
focus on Persons with Specific Needs (PSNs).
 Health & Sanitation Facilities: For minor emergencies an
ambulance service is available. In addition, safe drinking water
and toilet facilities have been provided at the centers, including
toilets for PSNs.
 Validation:VRFs are validated and assigned consecutive
numbers to enable individuals to receive cash grants at the
Encashment Centers (ECs) in Afghanistan.
 Luggage Verification: Luggage is checked to ensure
compliance.
 Transport: Self-organized transport both in Pakistan and
Afghanistan.
 Cash Grant: Each returnee receives a reintegration grant at the
ECs upon arrival in Afghanistan.
To ensure the safe and dignified return of Afghan refugees, implementing
and operational partners of the UNHCR are patrolling the major return routes.
The responsible staff is in continuous contact with law enforcement agencies
and returnees to address any unpleasant incidents during the return.
5. Urbanization of Afghan Refugees as a Missing Link
In the early years, Afghan refugees were kept in camps across the
country.279 However, the discontinuation of food assistance inside the camps
during 1995 led the Pakistani government to implement a policy shift in July
1997.280 The Secretary of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas and States and
Frontier Regions Division issued a notification regarding the status of Afghan
families living in Pakistan.281 The notification clearly justified the movement
of Afghan refugees into urban settlements and lifted the restrictions on
staying within the refugee camps. While, Afghan families that started work
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to earn bread faced discriminative treatment in the urban communities, the
issue was addressed after being brought up by the UNHCR and humanitarian
actors.
In the context of urbanization policy, almost 70 percent of the PoR
cardholders are currently living outside the camps, mostly as urban
refugees.282 The movement of refugees in the 1990s from camps to urban
communities created huge issues in tracing the records and later became a
vital contributor in making the Afghan case a protracted refugee case. 283
During the 1990s, along with the integration in urban settlements, repatriation
was an ongoing process, whereby the UNHCR and the World Food Program
(WFP) shrank their support and aid programs for refugee camps.284 Because
of the urbanization policy, the number of refugees in camps decreased, and
the burden was reduced on aid agencies.285 On the other hand, a large number
of legal and administrative issues arose. 286
The move to urban settlements simply changed the title of Afghans from
camp refugees to urban refugees and became a shift in state, not in status.
Furthermore, the reduced number of refugees in camps, as a result of
urbanization of refugees in the 1990s, had created an impression of a high
number of repatriated refugees; however, an increased number of refugees in
urban settlements had never been monitored due to the lack of proper
communication channels.287 There is still a visible disconnect between the
Provincial Commissionerates and the urban refugees, given that the
Provincial Commissionerates are designed and trained for camp
management.288 There is lack of a policy or any formal mechanism to
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effectively manage urban refugees.289 Due to urbanization, the repatriation
trend has dropped down and hosting fatigue between host communities has
also increased.290
6. Repatriation trend in Pakistan
The post-9/11 phase of voluntary repatriation was methodically
approached by the UNHCR; however, the repatriation program was
extensively affected by the unstable security situation in Afghanistan. 291
According to the UNHCR, 4,301,171 refugees had been repatriated from
Pakistan from 2002 until November 30, 2016, with the UNHCR’s
assistance.292 Despite the stable government between 2002 and 2015 and a
comparatively better security situation, Afghan refugees showed reluctance
to repatriation in 2006, 2009, and onwards due to lack of economic resources
and livelihood opportunities in Afghanistan. 293 According to the UNHCR, in
2016, 38 percent of the repatriating families preferred to remain in Pakistan
due to secure income in Pakistan; whereas 28 percent disclosed the fact of
lack of employment opportunities in Afghanistan during repatriation. 294 Lack
of secure income and livelihood opportunities are the major constraints in
voluntary repatriation.295 Apart from cash grants provided at ECs, there is no
other considerable assistance provided to returnees in Afghanistan. 296 The
UNHCR facilitates returnees via shelter projects, and this facilitation occurs
on an as-needed basis.297 However, the shelter project covers those vulnerable
returnees who have their own land in their places of origin; whereas, for the
289
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majority of returnees, land is another gargantuan issue.298 The Ministry of
Refugees and Repatriations (MoRR) is the guardian for Land Allocation
Schemes (LAS) in Afghanistan.299 Huge levels of corruption and thousands
of pending applications in LAS submerged the hopes of returnees for a
sustainable reintegration in Afghanistan.300 Similarly, in Afghanistan, the
policy of provision of assistance by the UNHCR and MoRR to only those
returnees who have VRF put the unregistered returnees in a nowhere
situation.301 These policies not only create barriers for reintegration of
returnees in Afghanistan but also compel the undocumented returnees to
recycle.302
Several times the UNHCR and humanitarian organizations in Pakistan have
sought to speed up and strengthen repatriation; however, the temporary
nature of those efforts was unable to generate a constant positive impact in
repatriation. In 2012, the UNHCR Pakistan bore the transportation cost of
returnees, which raised the graph of repatriation. However, after ending the
transportation allowance on December 31, 2012, a clear depression has been
observed in repatriation in the following years. Similarly, the situation
generated in the wake of the terrorist attack on the Army Public School (APS)
in Peshawar on December 16, 2014, created a push factor for Afghan
refugees, particularly in urban settlements. 303 The law enforcement agencies
started large-scale arrests, deportations, and harassment of Afghan refugees,
which not only refouled, but also compelled huge numbers of Afghan
families to opt for repatriation.304 The UNHCR responded well and controlled
298
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the situation with time by doing advocacy at different levels; however, the
role of the UNHCR seems limited in such situations.305 The APS incident
exposed the organization as only a humanitarian organization and reaffirmed
the mandate of the UNHCR, which is international protection and support of
governments in the return and development process.306 The trend of voluntary
repatriation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan since 2005 is shown below:307

The 58,211 refugees in 2015, as noted on the graph above, consist of
10,294 families that were repatriated; however, it is quite interesting that
women headed 20 percent of those repatriated families, whereas their
husbands stayed back in Pakistan and for most, the reason was secure income
in the country.308 This trend clearly depicts the shrinking asylum space in
Pakistan, which is a significant contributor in the unprepared returns
irrespective of the worsening security situation and lack of integration drivers
inside Afghanistan. In 2016, the UNHCR had planned to assist 150,000
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refugees through its repatriation operation.309 However, the figure has
reached to 58,981 families, including 381,275 refugees, due to various
factors, including (1) tight border management policy by the Government of
Pakistan, (2) short-term extensions of the validity of PoR cards resulting in
heightened anxiety and lack of predictability, (3) intensification of security
operations in Pakistan against undocumented Afghan refugees under the
National Action Plan (NAP) against terrorism, (4) a deteriorating protection
environment for Afghans in Pakistan, (5) doubling of the voluntary
repatriation and reintegration cash grant, and (6) strong appeal for refugees
return and proactive repatriation campaign by the President Ghani regime.310
The extension of the legal stay of Afghan refugees until December 31,
2017, is a prudent move by Islamabad. However, the Afghan refugee
situation is at a critical juncture now in Pakistan. Currently, the political
standoffishness between Afghanistan and Pakistan is acting as a primary
factor, which generates certain other factors discussed above that put the
Afghan refugees in a chaotic situation. The high repatriation numbers of 2016
do not signify a high level of absorptive capacity in Afghanistan, both
economically and socially. On the other hand, shrinking asylum space in
Pakistan and short-term extensions of the validity of PoR cards resulted in
heightened anxiety that compelled the Afghans to opt for repatriation. The
emergence of ISIS and active movements of Taliban in certain cities of
Afghanistan is another gargantuan threat for the Afghan government.311
These same factors, coupled with the unstable socioeconomic situation and
lack of livelihood sources, will be decisive factors for refugees in assessing
repatriation as a durable solution.
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E. Management and Repatriation Strategies for Afghan Refugees in
Pakistan
The Tripartite Commission Agreement focuses on the voluntary nature of
repatriation and regulates repatriation of Afghan refugees; 312 however, the
protracted nature of the Afghan case required a shift in policy to manage the
Afghan population in Pakistan and to explore possible alternatives for the
unique nature of Afghan case load. In this context, two strategies were
formulated for Afghan refugees, which are (1) the Afghan Management
Repatriation Strategy (AMRS) 2010-2012, and (2) Solutions Strategy for
Afghan Refugees (SSAR) 2013-2017.
Voluntary repatriation is the core component of these two strategies. 313 The
formulation of these strategies reflected a sense of realism among policy
makers that the complexity of the Afghan caseload required a broader lens to
identify alternative solutions and to make feasible grounds for voluntary
repatriation as a preferred durable solution. In order to manage the Afghan
refugees and to view their repatriation and reintegration in a broader scope, a
shift in policy by the Government of Pakistan was observed in 2008.314 The
cabinet of Pakistan approved the repatriation strategy for Afghan refugees on
May 9, 2007,with consultation of relevant stakeholders for the years 20072009.315 However, the relevant stakeholders raised several reservations.316 In
this context, the UNHCR focused on an open-ended policy and criticized the
limited timeframe of the repatriation strategy. 317 Similarly, the Government
of Afghanistan also raised reservations and requested to review the numerical
targets for repatriation in regards to a weak absorptive capacity and an
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unpredictable security situation in Afghanistan. 318 In order to review the
strategy and to respond to the reservations, a meeting was held between the
Prime Minister of Pakistan and the UNHCR in August 2008 to review the
strategy for extension.319 Afterwards, on August 29, 2008, at the 15th
Tripartite Commission Meeting at Islamabad, it was decided that the
repatriation strategy would go beyond 2009 and would be linked with the
Afghan National Development Strategy for the years 2009-2013.320
Based on the announcements in the 15th Tripartite Commission meeting
and in order to regulate repatriation and management of Afghan refugees in
Pakistan, a revised management and repatriation strategy was introduced for
the period of 2010-2012.321 The strategy was named the Afghan Management
and Repatriation Strategy (AMRS). Inputs from all relevant stakeholders
were included to cover all the issues related to Afghan refugees, including
repatriation and reintegration.322 In March 2010, after consulting all
government departments, the cabinet approved AMRS for the period of 20092012, which inter alia extended the validity of PoR cards and the Tripartite
Commission until December 2012.323 It was decided that AMRS would
focused on the following areas:324







Repatriation to and reintegration of refugees in Afghanistan
International support for refugees and repatriation
Host community development
Development of refugee-affected areas
Addressing security concerns in Pakistan due to refugee presence
Border management/crossing to control recycling
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 Constitution of a high-powered body to address Afghan refugee
issues both in Pakistan and Afghanistan for durable solutions
 Joint bilateral commission
 Temporary management of Afghan refugees living in Pakistan
during the period of 2010-2012
The introduction of temporary management of Afghan refugees in Pakistan
depicted a shift in policy by the Government of Pakistan; however, voluntary
repatriation remained the core component of the management and
repatriation strategy.325 AMRS clarified and reaffirmed the illegal status of
undocumented Afghan citizens living in Pakistan.326 The undocumented
Afghans would be deported and treated under the law of the land, which is
the 1946 Foreigners Act of Pakistan. 327 AMRS, in particular, focused on the
legal status of Afghan students, female heads of households, and the Afghan
investors in Pakistan.328 It was mentioned that those Afghans who had
invested five million Pakistani Rupees (PKR) in a productive business would
be issued work permits by Government of Pakistan. 329 Similarly, groups of
Afghans interested in bringing investments of over fifty million PKR would
be welcomed and encouraged.330 In addition, Afghan students would be
allowed to complete their education, and single women that have lost their
breadwinners would be allowed to stay in Pakistan. 331 To retain the effect of
Afghan refugees on Pakistan’s labor market, it was decided that the
Government of Pakistan would grant renewable visas to 150,000 skilled and
unskilled Afghans living in Pakistan. 332
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For implementation of AMRS, a High-Powered Body was established
under the authority of the Minister of SAFRON.333 The body was chaired by
the Minister of SAFRON and included the Chief Commissioner for Afghan
Refugees, the Secretaries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs Ministries, and
the representatives of other concerned departments. 334 The High-Powered
Body established five committees to guide the subjects of AMRS in a meeting
held on December 2, 2010.335 The committees are as follows:336
 Repatriationand Reintegration & Bilateral/Trilateral
Consultations
 Visas and Legal Residence Considerations & Regulations
 Border Management and Exit/Entry Regime
 Protection and Third Country Resettlement
 Security and Legal Channels for Registration
After forming the committees in the presence of the Home Secretary, the
Chief Commissioner, the Joint Secretary of SAFRON, the UNHCR, and
other relevant stakeholders, it was decided in a meeting to constitute
province-based subcommittees.337 In this context, the Secretary of SAFRON
designated provincial Home Secretaries to coordinate the subcommittees. 338
While revealing the achievement concerning AMRS, three strategic pillars
were mentioned in a joint bulletin regarding AMRS, which was issued by the
Ministry of SAFRON and the UNHCR in March 2011. The pillars are as
follows:339
 Socioeconomic profiling of registered Afghans in Pakistan.
 Legal framework including accession to the 1951 Convention et
al.
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 Operational framework to implement solutions envisaged under
AMRS.
In regards to issuance of visas and work permits claimed in AMRS, the
UNHCR mentioned that evidence-based data on vulnerability and economic
status of Afghan families could be a constructive step in socioeconomic
groupings.340 The data would also be capable of organizing voluntary
repatriation and assisting the Government and the UNHCR Afghanistan in
the reintegration of Afghan returnees.341 In this framework, the UNHCR
Pakistan conducted two surveys, which are,342 (1) a pilot project on
vulnerability entitled population, Profile and Verification (PPV) Survey
(January-March 2011); and (2) the Afghan Citizens Contribution to Economy
(ACCE) Survey.
AMRS was a first-rate concept, but it remained a draft and the proper
homework for its implementation was never done by the stakeholders. In
order to give permits and permission for settlement of students and single
women, a change in the law was required, which was not considered by the
executives and stakeholders involved in the issue. The policy makers of
AMRS were well aware that the complex nature of the Afghan case needed
priority consideration by the governments of both countries. Consequently,
policy makers linked the preferred durable solution (repatriation) with the
Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) to create a pull factor in
Afghanistan and to practice high-level communication between MoRR and
the Ministry of SAFRON.343 The participants of AMRS also agreed upon the
fact that “repatriation-at-once” in the case of Afghans was not feasible and it
was decided that repatriation figures would be planned in accordance with
the absorptive capacity of reintegration in Afghanistan. 344 In this regard, a
340
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stake for the Government of Pakistan was created in ANDS. 345 It was a very
vital step to understand the inhuman sufferings of returnees in a country
where the absorptive capacity is below the required level.
The implementation of AMRS was a huge challenge. In this regard, some
efforts have been made, but have not been compelling enough to implement
a strategy which covers all the issues related to Afghan’s case, including
repatriation, reintegration, and temporary management of registered Afghan
refugees living in Pakistan. The government of Afghanistan failed to create
pull factors in Afghanistan due to minimal absorptive capacity, lack of
infrastructural capacity, and a non-conducive environment.346 The
Government of Pakistan was also unsuccessful in bringing policy level
changes to prioritize the issue of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. In addition,
unpleasant political relations between the two countries played a critical role
in diverting attention from the most important regional issue. This situation
was enough to confirm the failure of AMRS.
The Afghan case is intricate and demanded solutions, which was the reason
to revamp AMRS. Due to lack of legislation, a deficit of political will, and
indecisive efforts for the management of Afghan refugees under the umbrella
of AMRS in Pakistan, policy makers shifted their attention from management
of refugees in the host country to sustainable reintegration of Afghan refugees
in Afghanistan. The management and repatriation strategy was replaced by a
regional solution strategy, SSAR, in May 2012.347 The governments of
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Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan adopted the strategy.348 The inclusion of the
Islamic Republic of Iran ensured that the Afghan case would be viewed as a
regional issue.349 SSAR focused on voluntary repatriation, sustainable
reintegration, and assistance to host communities to decrease the refugee
fatigue in hosting areas.350 The governments of Afghanistan, Iran, and
Pakistan, along with the UNHCR established the Quadripartite Steering
Committee to coordinate, guide, and implement the strategy. 351 The three
main themes of SSAR are:352
 Creating conditions conducive to voluntary repatriation through
community-based investments in areas of high return.
 Building Afghan refugee capital based on livelihood
opportunities in Afghanistan in order to facilitate return.
 Preserving asylum space in host countries, including enhanced
support for refugee hosting communities, alternative temporary
stay arrangements for the residual caseload, and resettlement in
third countries.
To address these subjects, it will be vital for the Quadripartite committee
to establish a coordinated engagement of humanitarian actors and
governments concerned, underpinned by a commitment to sustained and
tangible support by the international community. SSAR adopted a systematic
approach by including country specific portfolios in its overall policy
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framework. Five outcomes were named to assess the implementation of the
main subjects of SSAR:353
 Support to voluntary repatriation.
 Access to shelter and essential social services for refugees,
returnees, and host communities.
 Improved and diversified livelihood opportunities and enhanced
food security.
 Social and environmental protection of refugees, returnees, as
well as assistance and support to host communities.
 Capacity development of national authorities, associations,
organizations, and communities concerned with refugees,
returnees, and host communities.
During a Quadripartite meeting held in Iran on May 9, 2015, the concerned
governments and the UNHCR endorsed a second phase of SSAR, which is
from 2015-2017, for the unremitting support to the safe, dignified, and
voluntary return of Afghan refugees.354 SSAR is a well-structured regional
approach to address the need for a conducive environment in Afghanistan for
reintegration of returnees and investment in refugee-hosting areas to reduce
hosting fatigue.355 The strategy focuses on support for Afghan refugees and
prioritizes the needs of the Afghan population in each country to address the
main pillars of SSAR.356 In Afghanistan, the focus would be on reintegration,
and for this purpose, 48 pilot sites were identified in 19 high-return provinces
to assist with shelter, social services, employment, and food security.357
In this context, the UNHCR Afghanistan, along with MoRR, successfully
coordinated with 12 of the line Ministers in 2012 to prioritize development
of high-return zones via the National Priority Program. 358 In order to support
sustainable reintegration of returnees, Iran would launch programs, including
353
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vocational trainings, to add a skilled labor force in the Afghan market, which
would ultimately create a pull factor in Afghanistan. 359 In responding to
SSAR, Pakistan would emphasize voluntary repatriation and would support
refugee-hosting communities in order to contribute to the third pillar of SSAR
(Assistance to Host Communities).360
Pakistan hosted the third regional Quadripartite Steering Committee
meeting in Islamabad on September 18-19, 2013.361 All the relevant
stakeholders and delegates from the three countries participated with the aim
to strengthen cooperation, jointly mobilize resources, and to establish strong
partnership with the international community to end the protracted Afghan
refugee situation.362 The participants reaffirmed that the preferred durable
solution for Afghan refugees is still voluntary repatriation; however, the
sustainability of repatriation is contingent upon a conducive environment in
Afghanistan.363 Furthermore, the parties to the SSAR confirmed unanimously
that more funds and efforts are needed to achieve the goals of SSAR;
whereas, the education and livelihood sectors need more attention and
improvement in Afghanistan to create a pull factor for returnees.364 The
Minister of SAFRON reassured the long-lasting commitment of Pakistan to
the principle of voluntary and dignified return of Afghan refugees and urged
the international community to invest more in the RAHA program.365
The basic spirit for the implementation of SSAR is to invest in human
capital in Afghanistan, via creating livelihood opportunities, and to
compensate the refugees’ affected hosting areas. 366 In 2014, to operationalize
359
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SSAR, the concerned governments, along with their relevant humanitarian
and development actors, developed country-specific portfolios.367 These
portfolios provided a pragmatic and integrated framework for multilateral
cooperation and focused particularly on the health, education, and livelihood
sectors.368 However, each portfolio was unique and was designed in
accordance to the country-specific realities.369 The implementation of these
projects in a country-specific framework was structured within the five
outcomes of SSAR in order to bring coherence and to ensure coordinated
efforts.370 Coordination is imperative at the national and regional level among
concerned authorities not only for implementation of the regional solution
strategy but also to trace the progress of interventions and to guide the
coordinated efforts.
In this regard, National Steering Committees (NSCs) were established in
respective countries to monitor and supervise the pace of interventions under
the umbrella of SSAR.371 NSCs composed of representatives of key
government ministries will guide the implementation of SSAR in the national
spheres of concerned countries.372 In addition, platforms such as UN Country
Team (UNCT), Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), and “Friends of SSAR”
were established in Afghanistan to strengthen joint efforts in the context of
SSAR.373 The UNHCR uses these platforms to create awareness regarding
returnees’ issues in Afghanistan and work in close coordination with
MoRR.374 “Friends of SSAR” was considered one of the best practices in
Afghanistan and a valuable addition to SSAR.375 The platform recommends
policy issues to the Government of Afghanistan and the UNHCR, which
367
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includes integration of national policy framework, response gaps, and
resource mobilization for reintegration activities. 376 The establishment of
such kinds of platforms justified the struggle of humanitarian actors for joint
efforts to reintegrate returnees in Afghanistan. However, the successful and
sustainable reintegration of returnees would only be possible if the
Government of Afghanistan ensured a conducive environment for return and
humanitarian space for interventions.
Pakistan effectively continues its contribution by implementing RAHA
interventions to the third pillar (Assistance to host communities) of SSAR. 377
The revision and extension of the RAHA program until 2017 in line with
SSAR was endorsed by participating countries in early May 2015.378 RAHA
is a government-led initiative in Pakistan and a joint program with the
UNHCR.379 The RAHA program is an integral component of SSAR and the
government’s management and repatriation strategy for Afghan refugees in
Pakistan.380 It remains a primary solidarity platform for maintaining
temporary protection space and enhanced community acceptance of refugees
in Pakistan.381 In this context, it is essential for international donors to invest
in RAHA to create asylum space in hosting countries and to support
developmental interventions inside Afghanistan for a planned and sustainable
return of refugees.382 Since its launch, nearly 3,500 RAHA projects have been
implemented across the country, in the sectors of health, infrastructure,
livelihoods, water and sanitation, education, and social protection benefitting
over 10.6 million people.383 RAHA interventions promote communal
approaches and also mobilize and empower communities. 384 In this regard, a
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total of 3,390 community organizations, 285 village organizations, and 24
local support organizations are now actively engaged in planning and
implementing projects related to social services and infrastructure. 385
RAHA interventions particularly focused on primary health, education,
and capacity building of poor and vulnerable individuals through skill
development in saleable trades.386 In this perspective, an estimated 50 percent
of the total targeted 4,935 individuals were trained and engaged in incomegenerating trades.387 Primary health care services were provided to nearly
580,000 patients in Afghan refugee villages across the provinces of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, and Punjab through Basic Health Units
(BHUs).388 Free primary education was provided to over 71,000 refugee
children in 54 refugee villages in Pakistan.389 Access to free primary
education was ensured through 174 conventional schools, 4,848satellite
classrooms, and 13 early child education centers, with a total of 1,455
teachers.390 In this regard, particular attention was given to girls’ education
by focusing on increasing girls’ enrollment and retention.391
Being a host of 62 percent392 of registered and thousands of undocumented
Afghan refugees in Pakistan, a total of 38 RAHA projects worth
approximately $7.43 million were implemented in 2015 in the province of
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.393 To implement RAHA interventions, approximately
$32.036 million was spent from 2009 to 2015 in the major hosting province
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. 394
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Resettlement is an integral component of SSAR and one of the three
durable solutions.395 It is not only an appropriate protection tool for those
Afghan refugees who are unable to return and unable to stay in principal
hosting states, but also serves as an expression of solidarity on the part of
international community.396 Resettlement of Afghan refugees has remained a
priority of the UNHCR in the implementation of SSAR and is considered as
an important subject of the country-specific portfolios of Iran and Pakistan. 397
For the year 2015, 2,200 places were secured for resettlement from Pakistan,
particularly to the United States of America, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand.398 Compared to this target number, 1,242 cases of Afghan refugees
were filed by the end of August 2015.399 These cases included extremely
vulnerable Afghan refugees, such as chronic medical conditions, survivors of
violence and torture, and female-headed households, etc.
The required implementation budget of SSAR for 2015-2016 was one
billion dollars.400 The outcomes of SSAR were prioritized by allotting the
required budget to each outcome. In this regard, SSAR allotted $573 million
for access to essential services and shelter, $180 million for livelihood and
food security, $112 million for social and environmental protection and
resettlement, $162 million for voluntary repatriation, and $21 million for
capacity development.401
1. A Comparison of AMRS and SSAR
AMRS was more focused on management of Afghan refugees in Pakistan,
while SSAR focuses on voluntary repatriation, reintegration in Afghanistan,
and development of refugee-affected areas in Pakistan. However, the
395
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effective implementation of these strategies will only be possible if the
Afghan refugee issue becomes a priority case of all three concerned
governments: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. The voluntary nature of
repatriation remains at the heart of Pakistan’s National Refugee Policy,
reflecting a sense of realism among policymakers and an awareness that
Afghanistan’s poor law-and-order situation and shortage of livelihood
opportunities remain very significant hurdles to repatriation and sustainable
reintegration inside Afghanistan. To find solutions for the protracted
displacement of Afghan refugees, progress cannot be achieved without the
support of the international community. The support of SSAR and the
implementation of the Enhanced Voluntary Return and Reintegration
Package (EVRRP) will be decisive contributors to the sustainable
reintegration in Afghanistan.

V. A WAY FORWARD
Presenting solutions for a protracted refugee situation has always been
challenging. The back-and-forth movements of Afghan refugees between the
country of origin and principal state of asylum, lack of legislation regarding
refugees in Pakistan, and the ad hoc nature of various announcements and
notifications by the policy makers in Pakistan made it a complex case to be
resolved. This study attempted to classify suggestions in the mentioned
categories in order to highlight the operating areas for the concerned
governments, international political players, and humanitarian actors,
including UN agencies.
A. Recommendations for International Political Players
Political issues need political resolutions. The primary root cause of the
migration of Afghans was, initially, political instability—which was later
accelerated by the USSR invasion, civil war, Talibanization, and the US-led
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military intervention.402 In this context, it is important for stakeholders to note
that political stability and the establishment of the government’s writ in
Afghanistan is the only way to attract returnees. The role of humanitarian
actors, including the UN agencies, is limited given their narrow scope, and is
restricted to supporting the governments in the return and development
process. Afghan refugees need international attention more than ever before,
and the utmost priority should be given to the resolution of this protracted
humanitarian crisis in any future political settlement regarding Afghanistan.
Pakistan, India, China, and the United States should closely cooperate
and contribute to the international strategy for stabilization in
Afghanistan, including the fostering of Afghan-Pakistan amity. Pakistan
is not only a neighbor of Afghanistan sharing a very long border, but also has
been hosting Afghan refugees since Russian invasion. The bond is stronger
due to same tribes living on both sides of the border. The landlocked nature
of geographical boundaries is making Pakistan the easiest route to trade with
the international market for Afghanistan. The reality of the situation is
making Afghanistan a very important determinant of Pakistan’s foreign
policy. Therefore, restoring peace in Afghanistan is of high importance for
international power players like the United States and China, and regional
players like Pakistan and Iran.
The issue of Afghan refugees needs to be a priority issue for both
governments irrespective of the political tensions between the two
governments. The major constraints in voluntary repatriation should not be
addressed through responsibility shifting. In order to deal with the protracted
case of Afghan refugees, it is imperative for the governments of Afghanistan
and Pakistan to practice regular exchange of information, to encourage
efforts, and to develop a sustainable, integrated approach among UN
agencies,
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governments authorities (MoRR and Ministry of SAFRON) to implement a
comprehensive solutions strategy.
Pakistan needs an international push to end the protracted refugee
situation. The international community must redouble its efforts to support
Afghan refugees and should express solidarity not only in resettling Afghan
refugees but also to finance the RAHA interventions in order to support the
hosting communities who have welcomed, hosted, and supported Afghan
refugees for over 37 years in Pakistan.
B. Recommendations for the Government of Afghanistan
The repatriation must be linked with the national development and
favorable conditions in Afghanistan. The returnees’ concerns and qualms
regarding sustainable reintegration should be allied with the National Priority
Programs (NPP). It is essential to ensure the inclusion of SSAR’s outcomes
in NPP. Furthermore, the need for assessment of returnees in the host country
would be decisive and favorable not only in terms of facilitating returnees
through NPP interventions, but also to highlight the actual needs of returnees
that could guide and drive the NPP. Despite the existence of an exit
questionnaire in VRCs, information on the needs assessments of returnees
are still deficient, containing loop holes in coordination mechanisms between
the concerned quarters of the two countries.
Security and economic concerns are the two most significant reasons
for the continued exile of Afghan refugees. Both of these concerns are
entirely dependent upon political stability in Afghanistan. Recently, the
complex transition has largely affected the willingness to return of Afghan
refugees.403 Most of the refugees decided to postpone their return and adopted
wait-and-see policy in order to get a better picture of the impact of
presidential elections.404
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Corruption remains endemic in Afghanistan, which is a huge
challenge in transforming foreign investments into pull factors for
returnees. The government of Afghanistan must root out corruption and
incompetency in order to strengthen and streamline its institutions. There is
a need for transformational shifts in relevant institutions in terms of strength
and capacity to curb different forms of corruption hindering reintegration.
Priority must be given to extremely vulnerable, poor, and less
influential returnees in Afghanistan rather than powerful lobbies and
their supporters. Provisions and practices that discriminate against the most
vulnerable and impoverished landless returnees should be curbed. Besides
that, the UNHCR Afghanistan, MoRR, and DoRR should speedup
registration, tracking, and mapping of returnees at places of origin in order to
address and fulfill their needs for sustainable reintegration.
Land disputes and land encroachment issues must be resolved in
Afghanistan. Land disputes are long-pending and complex issues faced by
returnees in Afghanistan. However, the resolution of these issues needs
commitment, strong coordination, and rule of law in Afghanistan. UNHCR
Pakistan, along with CAR offices, can refer land-confiscated cases to MoRR,
DoRR, and UNHCR Afghanistan. In this regard, UNHCR Pakistan and CAR,
along with Implementing Partners (IPs), need to maintain information about
proper records of land-dispute cases. These cases can be shared through an
extensive sharing mechanism with the concerned organizations (working on
legal assistance) through UNHCR Afghanistan with the collaboration of
MoRR and DoRR.
Lack of community acceptance, ethnicity issues, and lack of harmony
still exist in Afghanistan. The government of Afghanistan can address these
issues with the fair and nondiscriminatory distribution of resources.
Furthermore, the intertribal tolerance among different lingual and multiethnic
groups could reach the highest level if fair and equal distribution of assistance
to returnees is maintained by the humanitarian actors, including UN agencies.
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The issues of landlessness and urbanization need immense efforts in
Afghanistan. A transparent approach is required in terms of allotting plots in
the Land Allocation Scheme (LAS) with the coordinated efforts of other
humanitarian organizations, including UN agencies, in order to ensure fair
distribution of land. In the future, the number of reintegration sites needs to
be increased by UNHCR Afghanistan in the provinces where the returnees’
arrivals are high. Besides that, the reintegration sites need to be fully
equipped, at least with basic services, which not only address the needs of
returnees but also plays a role in the discouragement of urbanization of
returnees. In this regard, it is important to make available viable land
schemes, sponsored by the government, in order to support comprehensive
reintegration interventions with livelihood strategies to ensure sustainability
in return. In addition, plots in the LAS should be distributed fairly and should
not be associated with certain social groups such as teachers, doctors,
parliamentarians, judges, etc.
The three main needs of returnees in Afghanistan are access to shelter,
land, and livelihood opportunities. These needs are somehow the subject
of international donors and humanitarian actors; however, they are dependent
upon the security situation in Afghanistan, and provision of a secure
environment is the utmost responsibility of the Government of Afghanistan
and international political players. The Afghan government could only
convince international donors to intervene in Afghanistan if it ensures access
of beneficiaries to interventions by creating a secure and conducive
environment.
C. Recommendations for Humanitarian Actors
The UNHCR Afghanistan policy of intervening in high-return areas
should be reviewed to include comparatively peaceful areas in order to
also make those areas livable and attractive for returnees. In this regard,
significant efforts and investment are needed in the sectors of health and
education by humanitarian organizations in rural areas. The attention of
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humanitarian actors will not only create a pull factor, but will also reduce the
urbanization trend among returnees, which is a huge challenge for the Afghan
government in the current setup of rehabilitation.
The investment in human development in Afghanistan requires joint
efforts by humanitarian actors and concerned government authorities to
create synergies. Certainly, it is a challenging task for the Afghan
government to invest in human development; however, a pull factor can be
created through provision or creation of livelihood opportunities and
humanitarian space in a country where every fifth citizen is a returnee.
Afghanistan should be considered in a state of conflict, which still
requires huge efforts in the humanitarian and development sectors. The
focus on the dilemma of Afghanistan should not be diverted to other newly
aroused crises around the globe in terms of budget allocations.
The Enhanced Voluntary Return and Reintegration Package
(EVRRP) must be implemented. This multipurpose cash grant has the
capacity to create a compelling pull factor in Afghanistan for returnees, which
will ultimately ensure the sustainability of reintegration. A step towards joint
resource mobilization, led by Afghanistan with the support of Pakistan and
UNHCR, for EVRRP shows the willingness of the parties. However, budget
constraints and corruption would be huge hurdles in the implementation. The
successful implementation of SSAR could only contribute to one of its main
themes (repatriation) if the stakeholders ensure the voluntariness and
sustainability in repatriation via implementation of EVRRP.
D. Recommendations for the Government of Pakistan
The protracted nature of the Afghan case demands legislation in
Pakistan. The majority of Afghan refugees living in Pakistan are youth. 405 In
this context, it is very essential to bring the Afghan refugees in to the national
sphere and to consider them part of Pakistan’s socioeconomic system.
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Certainly, the emphasis on sustainable reintegration in Afghanistan and
assistance to host communities in the current regional solution strategy
(SSAR) is a constructive approach; however, none of the solution strategies
can work if the needs of the second or even third generation refugees are not
addressed, particularly in terms of local integration in the host country.
Urban refugee management is a weak link in the overall refugee
framework in Pakistan. The lack of management is creating administrative,
social, and legal issues not only for the government and humanitarian actors,
but also for the genuine refugees overall. In the past, while formulating
policies for refugees, the emphasis of the government and the UNHCR was
extensively on the refugees residing in camps. Currently, almost 70 percent
of the PoR cardholders are living outside the camps, mostly as urban
refugees.406 As a result, there is a visible disconnect between the Provincial
Commissionerates and the refugees. Provincial Commissionerates are
designed and trained for camp management in Pakistan. 407 There is no policy
or any formal mechanism to effectively manage the out-of-camp or urban
refugees.408 Thus, in the absence of any clear policy and necessary outreach,
urban refugees in Pakistan are facing countless dilemmas. This is purely an
issue of management that needs to be addressed for the welfare of Afghan
refugees. It is, therefore, important to have an Urban Refugee Policy, which
will provide institutional guidelines for effective management of urban
refugees. The Ministry of SAFRON along with the UNHCR, in this respect,
should devise an urban refugee management policy in Pakistan.
The undocumented or unregistered Afghan refugees are in a nowhere
situation in both countries. Only those Afghan returnees who have
Voluntary Repatriation Forms (VRF) are entitled to receive the UNHCR and
MoRR assistance in Afghanistan.409 Similarly, the undocumented Afghan
406
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refugees in Pakistan are not the persons of concern of any humanitarian
organization, including the UNHCR, and are the subject of the 1946
Foreigner’s Act of Pakistan. It is therefore important to include such kinds of
returnees in the National Priority Program (NPP), without discrimination,
because otherwise they would be compelled to become recyclers in Pakistan.
The government of Pakistan should grant visas or register the undocumented
Afghans living in Pakistan. It is not only significant for security measures in
Pakistan but will also capture a clear image of resources utilized by the
overall Afghan population in Pakistan.
The legal stay of Afghan refugees must be long-term in Pakistan. The
government of Pakistan is well aware of the complexity of the Afghan case,
and in this regard, the short-term temporary legal stay will not only misuse
the resources through issuance of new PoR cards but will also create impasses
in the implementation of an in-practice regional solution strategy. The
Government of Pakistan must allow Afghan refugees for a long-term
temporary legal stay in Pakistan. A realistic deadline for repatriation should
be linked with the absorptive capacity of Afghanistan with no compromise
on the principles of voluntarism and gradualism.
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